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THE SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENTS AGAINST 
THE LEGALIZATION OF PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED 
SUICIDE
Introduction
The aim of this essay is to analyze the structure and formulate a prelimi-
nary evaluation of the soundness of one of the most commonly raised arguments 
against the legalization of physician-assisted suicide (hereafter PAS), namely, 
the so-called slippery slope argument (hereafter SSA). I will distinguish several 
versions of the argument and investigate the assumptions which, although often 
not made explicit in the debate, are necessary for the argument to produce the 
outcome desired by its proponent. It should be emphasized that the purpose of the 
essay is to reveal the complex structure of an important part of the discussion 
of the legalization of PAS, and not to provide defi nitive conclusions. The order of 
the article is as follows. In the fi rst stage, I distinguish PAS from related issues: 
euthanasia and withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment. Moreover, differ-
ent kinds of euthanasia will be described, for these distinctions play a signifi cant 
role in the SSA. The most basic structure of the argument will be revealed in 
this section, too. Then I will proceed to the discussion of the assumptions and 
values which are crucial to our subject. The problem of the legalization of PAS is 
clearly related to the issue of the weighting of different values; I think it is neces-
sary to make these considerations explicit. Moreover, it is an important task to 
distinguish the different levels of discussion of this problem, for they are often 
mixed in the literature, leading to confusing outcomes. After this, I will proceed 
to a detailed analysis of different kinds of SSA. Moreover, most of the relevant 
literature analyses the problem in the context of common law legal systems; I will 
make an attempt to reconstruct the logic of the argument in the context of civil 
law systems. Finally, I will provide the reader with some general conclusions.
One should note that I purposely narrow my investigations to the relation 
between a physician and a patient; therefore, other kinds of situations are beyond 
the scope of the article (for example, the situation in which a relative assists in 
the suicide of an ill person). However, at least some of the conclusions may be ap-
plied analogically to the contexts not analyzed in this article.
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PAS, euthanasia and withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment
There are several contexts in which the death of a patient may occur in rela-
tion to some kind of – very generally understood – action on the part of the doctor. 
The distinction between these phenomena is normally made with the use of the 
notion of the cause or action.1 Hence, we can defi ne the concepts mentioned in the 
above in the following way:
[E] Euthanasia is an act whereby a physician intentionally causes the death 
of a patient. 
[PAS] PAS is an act of self-destruction committed by a patient with the as-
sistance of a physician.
[WLSMT] Withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment consists of the 
foregoing life-sustaining treatments at the end of life of a patient, and the patient 
dies of his or her disease process.2
These working defi nitions are highly imprecise, because they contain several 
unexplained terms, for example the defi nition of euthanasia states that a physi-
cian intentionally causes the death. The concept of intention is understood differ-
ently in different legal orders (and often in the scope of one legal order), hence, the 
defi nitions presented above call for modifi cation. However, although I am aware 
of the problems related to the concepts involved here, I think that this oversimpli-
fying view is a good starting point for further considerations.
One more qualifi cation is necessary. A closer look at the defi nitions presented 
above reveals that in the case of PAS it is the patient’s ultimate decision to end 
his life; therefore, it is conceptually impossible to commit PAS against the will of 
a person who is subject to it.3 The contrary, however, is apparent when one consid-
ers euthanasia. It is obviously possible to carry out euthanasia with a patient who 
is not able to express his or her will, or even expresses a strong will to continue 
living. Hence, we can distinguish between voluntary, nonvoluntary and involun-
tary euthanasia:
[VE] Voluntary euthanasia is an act when a physician intentionally causes the 
death of a patient with a patient’s consent.
[NE] Nonvoluntary euthanasia is an act when a physician intentionally causes 
the death of a patient without a patient’s expression of will.
[IE] Involuntary euthanasia is an act when a physician intentionally causes 
the death of a patient against a patient’s will.4
1  Of course, there is no space here for a detailed discussion of the philosophical problems 
connected with these notions, even if the domain of the discussion would be narrowed to legal 
theory. 
2  R.M. Walker, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Legal Slippery Slope, “Cancer Control” 
2001, vol. 8, no. 1, pp  25–31, cf. pp. 26–27.
3  Assuming that in the crucial moment one is able to decide autonomously. In this place we 
ignore such contexts as committing PAS as a result of long-term persuasion against the (initial) 
will of the patient, and the like.
4  Cf. M. Szeroczyńska, Eutanazja i wspomagane samobójstwo na świecie (Euthanasia and 
Assisted Suicide in the World), Universitas, Kraków 2004, pp. 38–39, and further distinctions 
related to the concept of euthanasia, pp. 40–58.
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The basic structure of SSA
These considerations are important in the context of SSA against the legaliza-
tion of PAS since it is unanimously agreed that involuntary euthanasia is a mor-
ally unacceptable act. There is an on-going dispute concerning the moral permis-
sibility of nonvoluntary and voluntary euthanasia. The slippery slope argument 
makes use of these moral controversies. The basic structure of the argument is 
well known and can be expressed in the following manner: (1) if we allow A, B will 
likely follow. (2) But B is unacceptable. (3) Therefore, A is also unacceptable.5
This working defi nition is extremely vague. There are at least three serious 
conceptual problems which have to be solved if one wants to assess the soundness 
of the argument:
1) The notion of “allowance” used in the antecedent of the sentence (1) of the 
argument. It is not clear whether this amounts to moral acceptability, or to the 
legal status of A in question. For the sake of this essay I will treat “allowance” as 
“legalization.” Of course, it does not mean that this account is not closely related 
to moral considerations. This point will be elaborated in the next section.
2) The expression “will likely follow” which appears in the sentence (2) of the 
argument. It is not clear whether it should be interpreted logically, or empirically. 
As we will see in our discussion, both interpretations are possible, but they are 
used in different versions of the argument.
3) The notion of acceptance used in the sentences (2) and (3). The criteria of ac-
ceptance remain unclear. In particular, it is not obvious whether this expression 
should be construed psychologically, or normatively. This issue will be discussed 
in part entitled “Types of SSAs” of the essay.
Legalization of PAS. Dimensions of the discussion. Assumptions
The discussion of the legalization of PAS (and related controversial issues such 
as euthanasia or abortion) involves several different dimensions. The confusion of 
these dimensions may appear easily in the course of argumentation; therefore it 
is necessary to make them explicit. Of course, the catalogue of dimensions of the 
discussion is dependent on the assumptions held by the proponent of such a list. 
Hence, the formulation of this list creates an opportunity to also make these as-
sumptions explicit. For the purposes of this essay, we distinguish the following 
dimensions of the discussion:
1) The empirical dimension. This dimension is related to the causal relation-
ships between social phenomena. This dimension is purely descriptive, and we 
will not focus on it here. It is important here to avoid a potential confusion: I will 
discuss the arguments that are related to the empirical consequences of different 
5  Cf. W. van der Burg, The Slippery Slope Argument, “Ethics” 102 (October 1991), 
pp. 42–65, p. 42.
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actions. What is contended here is that this essay does not deal with real empiri-
cal data; however, we will discuss the potential importance of such data. 
2) The normative ethical dimension, related to the ethical justifi cation of a cer-
tain claim. It can be also used for the assessment of an existing or proposed legal 
regulation. Hence, it will play an important role in our investigations.
3) The legal dimension. This dimension contains the problems related to the 
determination of the content of existing laws. It is related to the characteris-
tic patterns of legal reasoning and focuses on the following question: given that 
a norm A is valid, is it also the case that a norm B is valid within the legal system 
S? The answer to this question will involve a different procedure in common law 
countries and in civil law countries, due to the differences in institutional set-
tings and in the sets of legal reasoning schemes. 
Of course, there are interesting interplays between these three dimensions. 
The results supplied by empirical evidence in the fi rst dimension may be relevant 
because of the assumptions or theses from the second. The importance of the in-
vestigations at the fi rst level will be serious if one assumes a consequential effect 
on the second. However, it is not the case that consequentialism is a necessary 
condition for taking the fi rst level into account. Non-consequential intuitions, 
held by a relevant group of people, may also play a role in normative ethical rea-
soning, but it is obvious that the assumed consequentialism will enhance the role 
of the fi rst level.
The relation between the second and third levels appears particularly inter-
esting in the context of the contemporary discussion on the concept of law. The 
role of the second dimension in developing the conclusions of the third is obvi-
ously determined by the assumptions concerning the nature of law. The dispute 
between positivism and non-positivism on the one hand, and between different 
strands of both schools is too well known to be described here.6 Unfortunately, 
these assumptions are rarely made explicit by the parties in discussions concern-
ing PAS. 
There is also an interesting relation between the fi rst and the third dimen-
sion. The determination of the possible consequences of a legal decision, together 
with an evaluation of these consequences, is one of the most important argumen-
tative tools in legal justifi cation.7 The set of the criteria of evaluation of these 
consequences will again depend on assumptions concerning the concept of law. In 
the non-positivist account, for example, the normative ethical dimension will play 
an important and sometimes dominating role. On the other hand, the positivist 
will claim that the system of law contains all the relevant criteria of evalua-
tion. However, there is another interesting feature of the relation between dimen-
sions 1 and 3. The fi rst, empirical dimension deals not only with general social 
processes, but also with the empirical causal relations in the world of the lawyers. 
Therefore, it is, at least in principle, able to predict the reactions of judges and 
legislators to different stimuli, and the content of these predictions may differ 
6  But see T. Pietrzykowski, Miękki pozytywizm i spór o regułę uznania (Soft Positivism and 
the Dispute Concerning the Rule of Recognition) [in:] J. Stelmach (ed.), Studia z fi lozofi i prawa 1, 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2001, pp. 97–122, especially pp. 99–100.
7  See K. Płeszka, Uzasadnianie decyzji interpretacyjnych przez ich konsekwencje (Justifi ca-
tion of Interpretative Decisions on the Basis of their Consequences), Universitas, Kraków 1996.
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from the content of conclusions developed in the third dimension, designed as 
a normative one. In the case of such a difference, a diffi cult problem arises which 
can be summarized in the following way: either lawyers have made mistakes as 
far as the content of existing law is concerned, or the assumptions held by nor-
mative theory in the third dimension are too remote from legal reality to be an 
adequate theory of legal reasoning. This tension is an obvious fact of legal reality 
and plays an important role in the discussion of the slippery slope argument.
All of the considerations mentioned above should be treated as a part of the 
background of our analysis. The second part of this background consists of a set 
of philosophical assumptions, which make the discussion possible and interest-
ing. The list of assumptions may be summarized as follows:
A1. Rejection of absolute ethical vitalism. It is sometimes ethically justifi ed for 
a person to take his or her own life. Moreover, it is sometimes ethically justifi ed 
that other people help this person in this.
A2. Rejection of the absolute autonomy principle. It is not always ethically 
justifi ed for a person to act according to his or her will. There are situations in 
which such decision has to be justifi ed by an additional argument but, on the 
other hand, these situations should be treated as exceptions to the general au-
tonomy principle.
A3. Rejection of strict nonconsequentialism. At least some weight has to be 
ascribed to the consequences of ethical choices. These consequences may affect 
the ethical qualifi cation of a particular choice.
A4. Rejection of absolute legislative voluntarism. The statutory provisions 
should be assessed against the criteria of normative ethics. If there is the pos-
sibility to draft a better regulation from the point of view of normative ethics, 
then it should be done. This assumption does not mean that normative ethics will 
always single out one best regulation. Moreover, one should not confuse this as-
sumption with the claim of non-positivism. Hence, I assume that a regulation re-
mains a valid law even if it is incompatible with important ethical considerations. 
A5. Prima facie plausibility of at least some versions of SSA. For the purposes 
of this essay I assume that at least some versions of SSA are – prima facie – 
sound arguments. The implausibility of the SSA has to be shown; these types of 
arguments should not be easily dismissed as simple logical fallacies.
I think that these assumptions are necessary in order to proceed with the dis-
cussion. The acceptance of absolute ethical vitalism or absolute autonomy princi-
ple makes it pointless. Strict nonconsequentialism makes most (but not all) of the 
SSAs null and void. Absolute legislative voluntarism leaves no space for de lege 
ferenda postulates in the situation of collision between the statutory provisions 
and principles of normative ethics. Finally, the prima facie implausibility of the 
SSAs nullifi es most of the contemporary discussion concerning the problem that 
is relevant here. It is worth emphasizing that all of the conclusions made here are 
developed in the context of these fi ve assumptions.
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The legalization of PAS in continental legal culture
Before we proceed to analyze the different types of the SSA, it is worth noting 
that the legalization of PAS may take at least two different forms in continental 
legal culture. I will discuss this problem in the context of the Polish legal system. 
It should be noted that assistance in suicide is penalized in Poland, according to 
article 151 of the Polish Penal Code.8 Of course, there is the possibility of deroga-
tion of this provision, however, it seems unacceptable, because there are obvious 
situations in which the inducement to suicide should be penalized. Therefore, 
there remain two ways of legalizing PAS.9 The fi rst one is to introduce an exclu-
sion of penal liability in the case of PAS. The second is to provide a subjective 
right to PAS. The implications of these two ways of legalizing PAS are likely to 
be different.
The fi rst proposed solution is to make PAS a circumstance that excludes penal 
liability to a perpetrator. Typical examples of such circumstances are: necessary 
defence and acting in the state of necessity.10 The statute has to specify the prem-
ises which, when fulfi lled in a given state of affairs, lead to the exclusion of penal 
liability although the characteristics of a type of an offence were also fulfi lled. 
In the case of PAS, the typical premises would be: the autonomous decision of 
a terminally ill adult patient, his excessive pain and suffering, the sympathetic 
motivation of a physician, probably also the confi rmation of the state of affairs by 
a commission of physicians.
Another way for the legalization of PAS – within the Polish legal system – 
would be to provide a subjective right (a claim) for a patient to demand assistance 
in his suicide. It is worth noting that providing such right would not lead to a con-
fl ict with the provision of art. 151 of Polish Penal Code. The physician would have 
a correlative duty to assist in the suicide of a patient. In consequence, he would 
not realize the characteristics of the omission described in art. 151, because it 
is not illegal to act accordingly with the rules prescribed to deal with a certain, 
legal good (in this case: human life), and these rules would be fi xed by the subjec-
tive right that we are discussing.11 It is important to note that in this case the 
subjective premise on the side of a physician (sympathetic motivation) would be 
senseless: if one has a duty correlative to the other person’s subjective right, then, 
given that the premises of this right are fulfi lled in the particular state of affairs, 
he should act according to his duty. Of course, the premises of exercising this 
8  Enacted on the 6th of June, 1997. Art. 151. Whoever by persuasion or by rendering assi-
stance induces a human being to make an attempt on his own life, should be subject to the 
penalty (...). Cf. www.era.int.
9  We assume this claim for the sake of simplicity. There are possibilities for the legalisation 
of PAS which do not have a form of exclusion of penal liability, but – on the other hand – do not 
lead to the ascription of a subjective right. See the discussion of a similar problem in the context 
of legality of abortion, K. Szutowska, Wrongful conception and wrongful birth and the abuse of 
the law, “Transformacje Prawa Prywatnego” 2006, no. 3–4, p. 103. 
10  Cf. articles 25 and 26 of Polish Penal Code.
11  Cf. A. Zoll [in:] idem (ed.), Penal Code. General Part. A Commentary, LEX a Wolters 
Kluwer Business, Warszawa 2007, p. 397.
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right should be specifi ed by a statute; the set of such premises would contain at 
least the autonomous decision of a terminally ill adult patient and his excessive 
pain and suffering.
The introduction of different groups of premises is an important point in the 
context of the SSAs. The objective premises (adult age, terminal illness) may 
obstruct at least some version of the SSA. However, there remains the premise 
of autonomous decision, which – due to its vagueness – may be “SSA sensitive.” 
I will continue this discussion after distinguishing between the different types of 
SSA in the next section.
Types of SSAs
Let us recollect the basic structure of SSA:
1) if we allow A, B will likely follow,
2) but B is unacceptable, therefore
3) A is also unacceptable. 
An important point is, of course, that A is acceptable as such, but the conclu-
sion expressed in the third sentence follows from the conjunction of the fi rst two 
sentences of the argument. Therefore, it is important to clarify the fi rst one. We 
have already explicated the expression “if we allow A:” for the purposes of this 
essay, we will understand it as “if PAS is legalized;” moreover, we have disam-
biguated the word “to legalize” by proposing two different ways of legalizing PAS: 
introducing the exclusion of penal liability or providing a subjective right to PAS. 
Our task is now to clarify the expression “B will likely follow.” In the context of 
our discussion it is not even obvious what is denoted by B. There are three prima 
facie plausible possibilities:
a) B denotes the legalization of (at least) voluntary euthanasia,
b) B denotes the practice of committing PAS by incompetent patients,
c) B denotes other disadvantageous consequences.
Let us note that a necessary condition of the discussion of the SSAs including 
the fi rst interpretation of B is an assumption that the legalization of voluntary 
euthanasia is undesirable (for its own sake or because it must lead to acceptance 
of non-voluntary, and even involuntary euthanasia). We take this assumption for 
granted for the purposes of this essay. The undesirability of the interpretations “b” 
and “c” is quite obvious. Therefore, having explained what are the possible inter-
pretations of B, we should proceed to analyze the expression “will likely follow.”
The interpretation of this expression is the most important criterion of classi-
fi cation of the SSAs. Although there is no – as F. Schauer puts it12 – authoritative 
typology of arguments in general, of the SSAs in particular, most authors agree 
that we should distinguish between the so-called logical (theoretical) slippery 
slopes (LSSAs) and empirical (practical) slippery slopes (ESSAs).13. The general 
12  F. Schauer, Slippery Slopes, “Harvard Law Review” 1985, vol. 99, pp. 361–383, see p. 364. 
13  See for example W. van der Burg, op.cit., pp. 42–65, see p. 43; R. Dworkin, Introduction 
[in:] R. Dworkin, T. Nagel, R. Nozick, J. Rawls, T.M. Scanlon, J.J. Thompson, Assisted Suicide: 
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difference between LSSAs and ESSAs is as follows. In the fi rst situation, the 
expression “B will likely follow” should be construed as “we are logically com-
mitted to allow B.” In the second, we should rather read it as “B will take place 
as a result of psychological or sociological processes.”14 Moreover, there are at 
least two versions of the LSSA. The fi rst holds that there is no signifi cant dif-
ference between A and B, hence, we are almost automatically forced to accept B, 
given A. The second one has the structure of a sorites paradox: although there is 
a signifi cant difference between A and B, once we accept A, we are forced to take 
a number of intermediate steps between them, which must result in the ultimate 
acceptance of B.15
Therefore, as a result of these preparatory investigations, we have received 
three interpretations of the fi rst sentences of the SSA:
(LSSA 1) If we allow A, we will be logically forced to allow B, due to the lack 
of signifi cant difference between them,
(LSSA 2) If we allow A, we will be logically forced to allow B, due to the sorites 
structure of the reasoning,
(ESSA ) If we allow A, B will (ultimately) take place due to the empirical 
processes.
As far as our task is to analyze these arguments from the point of view of 
mechanisms of normative ethics, we are in the position to construe the issue 
of “acceptance” used in the second and the third sentence of the argument. We 
will read this expression normatively, i.e. acceptable = acceptable from the point 
of view of assumptions and procedures of an assumed set of normative ethical 
claims. The most important of these claims were made explicit in our set of as-
sumptions. Therefore, we can for example state that the committing of PAS by 
incompetent patients may be unacceptable from the point of view of assumed 
normative ethics. 
Let us now go back to the dimensions of the discussion that we distinguished in 
section entitled “Legalization of PAS. Dimensions of the discussion. Assumptions” 
of this essay. We stated that we will focus on two levels: the level of normative 
ethics (what regulation is the best, according to the claims of normative ethics) 
and the level of legal reasoning (what is the content of existing law, given that the 
norm A is valid). This appears to give rise to a question concerning the relation 
of these dimensions to the three forms of SSA distinguished above. I think that 
a plausible account of this relation is as follows:
1. LSSA 1 may be considered from the point of view of both normative ethics 
and legal reasoning, for both levels involve conceptual reasoning and dis-
tinguishing of the concepts,
2. LSSA 2 may be considered from the point of view of legal reasoning, which 
is related to the problem of the judicial interpretation of vague predicates 
like “competent” or “autonomous.” See the discussion below,
The Philosophers Brief, “The New York Review of Books” 1997, vol. 4 , no. 5, March 27, http://
www.nybooks.com/articles/1237; P. Lewis, The Empirical Slippery Slope from Voluntary to Non- 
Voluntary Euthanasia, “Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics” 2007, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 197–210, 
cf. p. 197.
14  Cf. W. van der Burg, op.cit., p. 43. 
15  Ibidem, p. 44.
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3. ESSA can be analyzed mainly from the point of view of normative ethics, 
since we assume here a moderate consequentialism. It is “visible” to legal 
reasoning if and only if in a particular situation of legal decision-making 
there is the space to take the consequences of the decision into account, and 
the consequential considerations weigh more that the other, for example 
linguistic and systemic ones.
The next problem to be considered is to fi nd links between the different types 
of the argument and the possible interpretations of B. I think that it is plausible 
to propose the following links:
1) LSSA 1 has a link with the fi rst interpretation (the legalization of voluntary 
euthanasia). Therefore, the fi rst sentence of LSSA 1 may take the forms 
presented below:
1.1) if PAS is legalized, we are logically forced to legalize voluntary eu-
thanasia (there is no relevant ethical difference between them) (the 
dimension of normative ethics),
1.2) if PAS is legalized, we are logically forced to legalize voluntary eutha-
nasia (if voluntary euthanasia remains illegal, it creates an incoher-
ence in the legal system) (the dimension of legal reasoning);
2) LSSA 2 has a link with the second interpretation (the practice of commit-
ting PAS by incompetent patients). Of course, there is a signifi cant ethical 
difference between a competent and incompetent patient, and even if epis-
temic problems may appear concerning which concrete patient is compe-
tent or not, the normative ethics (given the assumptions accepted here) will 
remain immune to this argument. However, it may play a role in judicial 
practice, for the judge is obliged to render a decision in every single case. 
The vagueness of the predicates “competent” or “autonomous” may lead 
to the conclusion that the decision of the judge concerning the legality of 
a particular case of PAS will be legal, although it will remain doubtful, or 
even unacceptable, from the point of view of normative ethics. Of course, 
this conclusion is dependent on the empirical facts concerning the series of 
judicial decisions in similar cases. Therefore, the fi rst sentence of LSSA 2 
will take the following form:
– if PAS is legalized, the judge may be logically forced to accept the legal-
ity of the PAS of a patient, who is on the fringe of the predicate “compe-
tent;”
3) ESSA has links with all three of the interpretations of B. One should also 
note that the empirical consequences encompassed by B may be related to 
different social institutions (the legislative, the judiciary, the physicians 
etc.). Therefore, this version of SSA may take at least fi ve forms (all of 
which are related to the normative ethical dimension):
3.1) (ESSA 1) if PAS is legalized, voluntary euthanasia will, in fact, be legal-
ized. This version of ESSA may be called legislative-legislative ESSA,16
16  Cf. E. Volokh, The Mechanisms of The Slippery Slope, “Harvard Law Review” 2003, vol. 
116, pp. 1026–1136, at pp. 1077–1078. 
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3.2) (ESSA 2) if PAS is legalized, the judges will, in fact, extend the scope of 
the predicate “competent.” This may be called legislative-judicial ESSA,17
3.3) (ESSA 3) if PAS is legalized, it will lead to the actual performance of PAS 
on incompetent patients, to the actual performance of voluntary eutha-
nasia etc.,
3.4) (ESSA 4) if PAS is legalized, it will lead to the undermining of the integ-
rity of the medical profession. This, of course, results in disutility to this 
social group, and may affect patients,18
3.5) (ESSA 5) if PAS is legalized, it will cause psychological distress to the 
patients. On the other hand, it may be said that if will cause the effect of 
psychological reassurance to the patients, creating an option value (it is 
contended that the patient is better off if he is assured that he has a way 
of escaping from excessive pain and suffering through committing PAS).19
It is worth emphasizing that the list of different versions of SSAs developed 
above is a simplifi ed view, for two reasons. Firstly, the list of types of SSAs pre-
sented here is incomplete, because I decided not to mention some criteria of di-
vision of these arguments; nevertheless, I am convinced that the most relevant 
types of the argument – as far as the problem of the legalization of PAS is con-
cerned – are included here. Secondly, the arguments listed above are not com-
pletely separable in the discussion. We have already noted that ESSA 3.2 should 
be treated as a necessary condition of the soundness of LSSA 2. There are more 
relations similar to this one. However, for the sake of the purposes of this article, 
which are mainly analytical, I will analyze the arguments separately, signaliz-
ing the most important interactions between them. 
Two ways of legalization of PAS and the soundness 
of particular types of SSAs
The aim of this section is to assess the soundness of different types of SSA in 
the context of the legalization of PAS within the Polish legal system. I have dis-
17  Ibidem, pp. 1082–1086. This version of ESSA is a necessary condition of the soundness 
of our version of LSSA 2. Let us also note that it is, in fact, a compound argument, consisting 
of legislative-judicial and judicial-judicial relations (in a series of cases, the scope of the predi-
cate in question may be broadened). Although the judicial-judicial slippery slope plays a more 
important law in common law countries, it has increasing signifi cance also in continental 
legal culture, due to the increasing role of judges. However, we do not distinguish between 
a separate type of judicial-judicial slippery slope, because this would lead to the changing of 
the interpretation of antecedent of the fi rst sentence of SSA: it would no longer be read as “if 
PAS is legalized” but “if a patient A, who manifests characteristics [x,y,...n] is entitled to PAS.” 
Of course, the consequent would have an analogical form: “then the patient B, who manifests 
the characteristics [x,y,z....n] is also entitled to PAS.” Note that this is the domain when con-
sequentalist legal reasoning comes into play, hence, this kind of judicial-judicial slippery slope 
is a version of ESSA. 
18  Cf. E. Emanuel, What Is the Great Benefi t of Legalizing Euthanasia Or Physician-Assisted 
Suicide, “Ethics” 1999, vol. 109, pp. 629–642, at p. 636.
19  Ibidem, pp. 636–637 and 635.
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tinguished between eight versions of the argument, which gives us sixteen pos-
sible combinations, given the two forms of the legalization of PAS. I will evaluate 
the soundness of the arguments one after the other, beginning with the legaliza-
tion of PAS through the exclusion of penal liability, and then I will proceed to 
consider the consequences of legalizing it by establishing a subjective right.
1. Legalization of PAS through exclusion of penal liability
One of the possible forms of the legalization of PAS is to introduce a new cir-
cumstance excluding penal liability into the Penal Code, namely, the circum-
stance of PAS. Of course, such circumstance must be described by a set of prem-
ises. We have proposed that this set should consist of:
1) the age of a patient (a patient should be an adult person),
2) the autonomous decision of a patient (i.e. a patient must be competent while 
asking for PAS),
3) the terminal illness of a patient,
4) his intolerable pain and suffering,
5) the sympathetic motivation of a physician.20
A physician, assisting in a suicide of a patient in a situation fulfi lling this set 
of premises, would be excluded from penal liability due to the lack of the illegal-
ity of his deed. Let us now assume that we interpret the antecedent of the fi rst 
sentence of SSA as introducing such an exclusion of penal liability and proceed to 
the assessment of different versions of SSA in this context.
1. LSSA 1. We examine the argument on the two levels: normative ethical 
level and the level of legal reasoning.
1.1. The argument is unsound, for there is an ethically signifi cant differ-
ence between PAS and voluntary euthanasia: the latter involves the 
physician causing the death of a patient, while the former consists of 
the patient himself taking his life,
1.2. The argument is presumably sound, because the introduction of the 
exclusion of penal liability in the case of PAS leads to an incoherence 
in the legal system: on the one hand, PAS is legal (as opposed to as-
sisted suicide in general), on the other hand, voluntary euthanasia re-
mains illegal (for the sake of the coherence of the system, it should be 
legalized as an exclusion of penal liability, as opposed to intentional 
murder; but, we assume, the legalization of voluntary euthanasia is 
unacceptable; therefore, the legalization of PAS is also unacceptable,
2. LSSA 2. The argument may be sound, given that we have empirical evi-
dence that confi rms the soundness of ESSA 3.2. However, it is often dif-
fi cult to obtain such empirical data. What is more, judges often tend to 
construe the provisions of penal law restrictively. On the other hand, it is 
true that no principled line can be drawn between the (fully) competent 
20  This set may be supplemented by procedural premises, like, for example, the confi rmation 
of the state of a patient by a commission of physicians.
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and the (totally) incompetent patient.21 In consequence, we cannot provide 
a conclusive argument related to the soundness of LSSA 2; however, it is 
not the case that it is necessarily mistaken,
3. ESSAs. We will examine all fi ve versions of the argument.
3.1. The argument seems to be sound when one takes LSSA 1.2 into ac-
count. On the other hand, empirical evidence, related to the case of 
Oregon shows that the opposite is the case: although it may seem – 
from the point of view of coherence of the system – that voluntary eu-
thanasia should be legalized given that PAS is legal, the opposite is the 
case.22 Therefore, I tend to assess ESSA 1 as unsound,
3.2. The argument is presumably unsound, due to the generally accepted 
directive of the restrictive interpretation of penal law. However, the 
increasing role of the judiciary in continental legal culture may alter 
this tentative conclusion,
3.3. The soundness of this argument is diffi cult to be assessed because it 
depends on multiple different factors, like the attitude of the majority 
of society towards minorities, the disabled, the elderly etc. It is also de-
pendant on the general ethos of the society and its attitude towards the 
law. If we assume the pessimistic, Hobbesian view of human nature 
and motivations, the argument should be assessed as arguably sound, 
but on the other hand there exists reliable data that does not confi rm 
such a fatalistic view,23
3.4. This argument is presumably unsound, because the exclusion of penal 
liability does not impose any duty on a physician; it only creates the 
possibility of assisting in the suicide in certain circumstances, and in 
the case of the sympathetic motivation of a physician. However, the 
fi nal assessment of the argument is not possible without the empirical 
investigations related to the social group of physicians,
3.5. The soundness of this argument depends upon the validity of ESSA 3 
(and, probably, ESSA 4). If this is the case that physicians induce in-
competent patients to commit PAS, or if there is a tendency towards 
non-voluntary or even involuntary euthanasia, the argument would 
be sound. If the contrary would be the case, it would be presumably 
unsound.
21  Note that the introduction of objective premises like age of a patient or terminal illness 
automatically exempts us from the discussion of awkward versions of the SSA, related to the 
slope between the terminally ill, dying, elderly patient and the 16 year old boy suffering from 
unrequited love. Cf. R. Dworkin, op.cit. 
22  P. Lewis, op.cit., p. 198.
23  Cf. for example C.F. Ryan, Pulling Up the Runaway: The effect of New Evidence in 
Euthanasia’s Slippery Slope, “Journal of Medical Ethics” 1998, vol. 24, pp. 341–344. The article 
analyzes the problem of ESSA in the context of euthanasia, but its conclusions may be applied 
analogously to the issue of PAS. 
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2. Legalization of PAS through the ascription of a subjective right to 
patients
Another way of legalizing PAS is to introduce a subjective right to PAS. In 
this case, the patient would be entitled to PAS, and a doctor would have a cor-
relative duty to assist in the patient’s suicide. As we have suggested before, the 
possible set of the premises of exercising such a right would have a very similar 
form to the set of premises of the exclusion of penal liability, minus the sympa-
thetic motivation of a physician. However, in the case of subjective right, this set 
of premises appears to be more controversial. This is due to the fact that ascrip-
tion of a subjective right should not be discriminatory. In the case of exclusion 
of penal liability, the correlation between the intolerable pain and suffering of 
a patient and the sympathetic motivation of a doctor was obvious. In the case of 
a subjective right one may raise the question of whether the pain and suffering 
of a patient is a justifi ed premise, since the ascription of subjective rights should 
not depend upon accidental features, like the ability to bear the pain. Hence, the 
premise of intolerable pain and suffering would seem to be fi ctitious, due to the 
possibility of simulation on the part of the patients. However, this psychological 
problem is beyond the scope of this article. I will now proceed to the assessment 
of the eight versions of SSA, analogically to the analysis devoted to the exclusion 
of penal liability.
1. LSSA 1. 
1.1. Analogically to the reasoning presented above, this argument pres-
ents itself as prima facie unsound, because I think that the normative 
distinction between the claim to demand assistance in suicide and the 
right to demand the active ending of life by a physician may be treated 
as signifi cant. On the other hand, when we take the postulate of non-
discrimination in assigning subjective rights into account, this conclu-
sion appears to be doubtful, because the ability to commit suicide by 
a patient depends on the kind of illness that he has, and this is a fortu-
itous circumstance, which should not affect the ascription of subjective 
rights. In consequence, we have a stalemate situation, 
1.2. The same observations are valid in the case of LSSA 1 in the domain of 
legal reasoning and the coherence of legal system. Although in the case 
of subjective right the discussed analogy (a type of omission – exclusion 
of penal liability) does not work, one may raise the question of whether 
discrimination is at play in the attributing of subjective rights,
2. LSSA 2. The soundness of this argument, as it was said before, depends on 
the validity of ESSA 3. Anticipating the considerations relating to the lat-
ter, I tend to assess the argument as unsound,
3. ESSA. Again, we will analyze fi ve versions of the argument.
3.1. We may assert the soundness of this argument with greater confi dence 
than in the case of exclusion of penal liability, because of the possibility 
of lobbying for the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia due to the anti-
discrimination argument discussed above,
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3.2. As far as the regulation of a subjective right to PAS would not be an 
element of penal codifi cation, the reason against the soundness of the 
argument arising from the directive of restrictive interpretation does 
not play a role here. Moreover, the possibly fi ctitious role of the prem-
ise of pain and suffering results in the evaluation of this argument as 
presumably sound,
3.3. The soundness of this argument is dependent upon the same factors 
as in the case of exclusion of penal liability. However, I would like to 
emphasize once again that some of the practices which are described 
in the course of this argument would be likely to appear not only be-
cause of the features that are discussed in Hobbesian view of a human 
being, but also because of the anti-discriminatory postulate discussed 
above. Given that PAS is legal, at least some doctors would tend to 
perform the illegal practice of voluntary euthanasia because of their 
assessment of this regulation as unjust. The fi nal evaluation of this 
argument is dependent on empirical research,
3.4. The argument is presumably sound, because in this case a physician 
is obliged to assist in the suicide of a patient, upon his or her request. 
This results in forcing a physician to act contrary to the Hippocratic 
Oath, which probably would undermine the integrity of medical profes-
sion more seriously than in the case of exclusion of penal liability,
3.5. Like in the previously discussed case, the evaluation of ESSA 5 is 
dependent on the assessment of ESSA 3. Therefore, the observations 
made in the context of the exclusion of penal liability remain in force. 
On the other hand, people are generally better off when they are at-
tributed with subjective rights. Hence, the argument is presumably 
unsound.
One should note that the conclusions are tentative and they may be subject to 
refutation due to different factors. Nevertheless, I am convinced that they offer 
at least a good starting point in a discussion concerning a particular type of SSA 
in the context of PAS. These results may be summarized in the following table.
Table 1.
Two forms of legalization of PAS and tentative conclusions concerning 
the soundness of SSAs.
Type of SSA/form of 
legalization of PAS
Exclusion of penal 
liability
Attribution 
of a subjective right
1. LSSA 1.1 unsound undecided
2. LSSA 1.2 presumably sound undecided
3. LSSA 2 undecided unsound
4. ESSA 1 presumably unsound presumably sound
5. ESSA 2 presumably unsound presumably sound
6. ESSA 3 undecided undecided
7. ESSA 4 presumably unsound presumably sound
8. ESSA 5 undecided presumably unsound
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Conclusions
We have distinguished between eight types of SSA. I think that these eight 
types of argument are the most commonly raised in the context of PAS/eutha-
nasia debate. Of course, the proposed typology of arguments is by no means 
exclusive; for example that some authors treat only ESSAs as genuine SSAs.24 
Moreover, we have set aside some important types of argument which appear in 
the discussion, for example the mentioned judicial-judicial SSA, or the slippery 
slope from withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment to PAS, and fi nally to 
different types of euthanasia. One should also note that our analysis makes sense 
if and only if one accepts the set of assumptions that I employ here; another set 
of assumptions might even make the whole discussion pointless. What is more, 
the main aim of the essay was to disambiguate the discussed arguments and to 
set them in order, not to provide defi nitive conclusions pertaining to their valid-
ity. It should be noted that the proposed set of premises of the provisions legal-
izing PAS is not uncontroversial and probably literally any of these premises may 
be contested, thereby creating an impulse for a new discussion. Nevertheless, 
I think that the investigations made here enable us to formulate some general, 
but important conclusions. Firstly, in a discussion concerning the SSA (not only 
in the context of PAS), it is crucial to explicate the exact type of argument that 
is used, (whether it is a LSSA or ESSA), and to clarify the following issues: the 
exact content of the consequent and antecedent of the fi rst sentence of the argu-
ment and the criteria of acceptability that are in use. Secondly, the dimension of 
the discussion should be clarifi ed, for the assumptions and criteria of assessment 
may differ in respect to the dimension in question: the normative ethical or the 
legal. Thirdly, the assessment of the soundness of different types of SSAs is not 
an easy task; the results developed here should be treated as tentative. It appears 
to be particularly diffi cult to assess the ESSAs, due to the lack of relevant empiri-
cal data and methodological doubts concerning the gathering and interpretation 
of this data. However, it would be naïve to state that we are able to gather all 
relevant empirical data with regard to every “slippery-slope problem” in question; 
rather the opposite is the case – we have to deal with them without a suffi cient 
amount of empirical information, relying on our assumptions and accepted meth-
ods of valid reasoning. In consequence, fourthly, the analysis of the structure of 
SSAs, and their assumptions, is an important task which lies ahead for the legal 
philosopher. SSAs play an important role in political and ethical debates and 
must not be easily dismissed as logical fallacies. Therefore, this essay may be 
seen as an attempt to clarify the basic problems related to this discussion, a basis 
for more refi ned analyses concerning particular types of SSAs.
24  Cf. F. Schauer, op.cit., p. 369, discussing the notions of “instant case” and “danger case” 
on the end of a slippery slope.
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